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"Deep" Impact: Can a Tort Theory of
Deepening Insolvency Survive in the
"Options Backdating" Era?
Phillip G. Lewis'
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite humble beginnings as mere dictum in a 1983 Seventh Circuit
opinion,' the theory of deepening insolvency has seen a rapid expansion
within the legal community, becoming the object of much scholarly de-
bate.3 In recent years, deepening insolvency has proven to be quite the
chameleon, adapting to fit inconspicuously into our legal environment as
either a measure of damages 4 or an independent cause of action in tort.'
Notwithstanding sparse case law on the subject, speculation as to the appli-
cability of the tort theory of deepening insolvency has grown by leaps and
bounds since the tort theory's genesis in the 2001 case of Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F Lafferty & Co., Inc. 6 Lafferty's proposition-that
"an injury to the [diebtors' corporate property from the fraudulent expan-
sion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life"7 was remedied as
i J.D. expected zoo8, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S., Economics, B.B.A.,
Finance, University of Kentucky, 2001. 1 would like to thank the members of the Kentucky
Law Journal for their faithful assistance in the editing process. Additionally, I would like to
extend special thanks to my family for its support and understanding during my research-in-
duced mood swings, and also my father for, at a young age, initiating my interest in the stock
markets.
2 Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983) (postulating that a "corporate
body is ineluctably damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure
to creditor liability"); see also Sabin Willett, The Shallows of Deepening Insolventy, 60 Bus. L. 549,
550 (2005) (noting the dictum of Schacht as causing the evolution of the theory of deepening
insolvency).
3 According to LEXIS, the topic of deepening insolvency has been covered in sixty-one
law reviews and journals (last searched May 19 2007.
4 See, e.g., Schacht, 711 Fd 1343; Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 149 A.D.2d 165 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989). For a detailed discussion of the evolution of deepening insolvency as a mea-
sure of damages, see J. B. Heaton, Deepening Insolvency, 30 J. CORP. L. 465,476-81 (2005).
5 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.3d
340 (3rd Cir. 2001), overruled in part by In re Cybergeneics Corp., 304 F3d 316 (3rd Cir. zooz).
6 Id. at 351
7 Id. at 347.
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a tort-has led to a wave of decisions recognizing the tort in other jurisdic-
tions. However, as pointed out in previous works, the greatest criticism of
this tort theory is its "novelty."8
Armed with only the Lafferty decision, judges have been called into the
role of fortune teller and have been asked to evaluate not only whether
courts in their jurisdictions would recognize such a claim in tort but also
to whom this liability extends. 9 The results have been mixed, to say the
least.1" Despite minor setbacks," the theory has been recognized as an in-
dependent cause of action in a variety of jurisdictions."2 Moreover, a variety
of third party professionals, such as financial advisors 3 and most recently
bankers 4 and lenders," can be held liable in tort for deepening the in-
solvency of a business enterprise by eroding its intrinsic value. Further
stretching of the Lafferty holding to include situations in which mere "neg-
ligence" has caused the injury to corporate property, instead of the requisite
"fraudulent prolongation of a corporation's life,"16 adds to the uncertainty
as to the outcome in any given insolvency case.
Faced with the recent case law and fear of reprisal, it is not far-fetched
to say that many members of the business community are hesitant to en-
gage in any activities with a corporation that has fallen on hard times. The
spring and summer of 2006 have offered a brand new avenue concerning
applicability of the deepening insolvency claims.' 7 Still reeling from the
havoc caused by Enron's improprieties, 8 directors and officers of several
8 See, e.g., Jo Ann J. Brighton, Deepening the Blows Against Deepening Insolvency, 25-SEP AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 24,68 (Sept. 2005) (recognizing tort theory of deepening insolvency as a "novel
theory of recovery"); Willett, supra note 2, at 550 (referring to the recognition of deepening
insolvency as independent cause of action as "evolution at light speed"); Daniel E. Harrell,
Note, Pandora's Bankruptcy Tort: The Potential for Circumvention of the Business Judgment Rule
Through the Tort Theory of Deepening Insolvency, 36 CuMB. L. REV. 15I, 152 (2006) ("A major prob-
lem with the deepening insolvency theory of tort liability is its novelty.").
9 See infra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
i o See infra notes 62-105 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., In re LTV Steel Co., 333 B.R. 397, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2oo5) (noting grow-
ing acceptance of tort theory of deepening insolvency and collecting complementary cases
from other jurisdictions).
13 See Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721,
724, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001).
14 See Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group LLC), 3 16 B.R. 451, 454
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
15 See In re Exide Techs., Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 751-52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
16 See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983).
17 See infra notes 1o6-84 and accompanying text.
18 To find out more about the pain and suffering faced by creditors, employees, and
stakeholders when the Enron house of cards came tumbling down, see Enron Home Page,
http://www.enron.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2007); see also ENRON: TIhE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
RooM (Magnolia Pictures 2005). See generally John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard
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of the country's largest publicly traded companies 9 find themselves em-
broiled in a controversy further exposing corporate greed and stakeholder
abuse, which has been dubbed "options backdating."
Options backdating occurs when "a company grants stock options to
key employees that are dated to a time in the past when the stock price
was lower than the stock's current price."" ° This scheme thereby guaran-
tees the holder of such options a handsome profit. While options backdat-
ing is not per se illegal,2" the extraneous effects of the options backdating
scandal could lead to a deepening insolvency claim against company direc-
tors, officers and lenders.2 However, fret not, dear malfeasant and greedy
corporate executives, because help is already on the way. Three 2006 deci-
sions, 3 including one from the Delaware Court of Chancery, 4 have cast
serious doubt upon the viability of maintaining a deepening insolvency
claim against company directors or lenders.
This Note stands for the proposal that, although a deepening insolvency
claim could manifest in tort against corporate defendants, recent decisions
have vitiated any likelihood of success in bringing such an action. Part II of
this Note will briefly detail the development of Lafferty and its application
in subsequent cases. Part III will identify recent cases that have questioned
the Lafferty decision and evaluate the effect on the future of deepening
insolvency. Part IV will investigate the events that have brought "options
backdating" into the American lexicon, including a detailed account of the
role of hedge funds 5 as a catalyst in an option backdating firm's move into
the "zone of insolvency."2 6 Finally, Part V will conclude this discussion by
setting forth the reasons why a deepening insolvency claim against a back-
dating corporation would prove an unnecessary and inefficient use of cor-
porate time and money due to its inherently duplicative nature.
Around the World and the International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211 (2003).
19 For a detailed listing of companies with alleged involvement in options backdating,
see Wall Street Journal Options Scorecard, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
info-optionsscoreo6-year-end.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
2o Financial Terms: DefiningMoney, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. i i, zoo6, at 54.
21 Bruce G. Vanyo & Michael S. Weisman, Back-dating Stock Options: An Overview, 1557
PLI/Corp 623, 625 (2oo6) ("(Nlegative press notwithstanding, it does not appear that back-
dating is per se illegal.").
22 See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
24 Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168, 205 (Del. Ch. 2006).
25 See infra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
26 "Insolvency" is defined as "[tihe condition of being unable to pay debts as they fall
due or in the usual course of business." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNRY 354 (8th ed. 2004). The
"zone of insolvency" is considered to be the time at which the possibility of insolvency is very
likely for an operating, perhaps solvent, corporation. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V.
v. Pathe Commc'n, No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at *Io8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
2oo6-2oo7]
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II. LAFFERP7'r EXPANDING THE HORIZONS OF TORT LAW
Deepening insolvency has received much attention for its malleability into
the tort law environment.2 7 However, its roots date back much further, first
taking shape as a way for courts to "avoid imputing the wrongdoing of cor-
porate directors and officers to a bankrupt plaintiff corporation" then later
as a "theory of standing and damages.""8 In its latter form, the difference
in a corporation's "increased exposure to creditor liability" 9 and available
assets was proof positive that impropriety had occurred and the corporation
was exposed to damages at least in amounts equal to the amount of that
diminution.3"
A. The Lafferty Decision
Given the role Lafferty has played in molding the damage theory of deep-
ening insolvency and recognizing it as an injury in its own right, an exami-
nation of the landmark decision is also warranted in this Note, even though
it has been discussed exhaustively in recent scholarly works.3 Lafferty
involved a "Ponzi scheme '32 allegedly operated by William Shapiro and
family33 via two lease-financing companies, Walnut Equipment Leasing
Company ("Walnut") and its wholly owned subsidiary, Equipment Leas-
ing Corporation of America ("ELCO'). 34 Because Walnut's financial hard-
ships prevented it from raising money through an issuance of corporate
debt securities,3 Shapiro created ELCOA as a wholly owned subsidiary.36
Despite being "fraudulently marked as an independent business entity,
' 37
ELCOA's lone purpose was to provide Shapiro a company with a rosy finan-
cial outlook that could serve as a debt issuing conduit for Walnut's benefit.3"
27 See infra notes 31-io5 and accompanying text.
28 Heaton, supra note 4, at 468.
29 Schacht v. Brown, 711 F2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983).
30 See id. at 1348; Heaton, supra note 4, at 476.
3' See, e.g., Gregg W. Mackuse, Damages For "Deepening Insolvency": A Defendant's
Nightmare?, 74 PA. B.A. Q. 42 (Jan. 2003); Heaton, supra note 4; Willett, supra note z; Harrell,
supra note 8.
32 "Ponzi scheme" is defined as a "fraudulent investment scheme in which money con-
tributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for the original investors."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 536 (8th ed. 2oo4).
33 Hereinafter referred to collectively as "Shapiro."
34 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.E Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F3d 340, 344
(3rd Cir. 2001), overruled in part by In re Cybergeneics Corp., 304 F.3d 3 16 (3rd Cir. zooz).
35 For definition of "corporate debt securities," see infra notes 1o6-12 and accompany-
ing text.
36 Laffery, 267 F3d at 344.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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To provide an image of financial prudence, Shapiro allegedly misstated
both companies' financials and conspired with an accountant and an under-
writer39 to present positive professional opinions of the failing companies'
viabilities.' These improprieties allowed Shapiro to obtain registration of
their debt securities, culminating in the offer and sale of these securities to
the investing public.4'
Ultimately, the companies were unable to repay the debt, and the ven-
ture ended in the bankruptcy of both Walnut and ELCOA.41 Subsequently,
a Bankruptcy trustee appointed a Committee to represent the claims of the
companies' unsecured creditors. 43 On behalf of the corporation, the Com-
mittee initiated an action against Shapiro and the third party professionals
for their roles in "'wrongfully expand[ing] the [D]ebtors' debt out of all
proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately forc[ing] the [D]ebtors
to seek bankruptcy protection."'" Although characterizing this activity as
deepening insolvency,45 the U.S. District Court summarily dismissed the
Committee's claims.'
The Committee subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. 47 After finding that the Committee had standing to bring the case
on behalf of the corporation,48 the court moved to the determination of
whether deepening insolvency was a viable theory of injury under Penn-
sylvania law.49 Armed with little jurisdictional guidance to handle the novel
claim,5" the Court of Appeals predicted how a Pennsylvania state court
would decide the matter, using "law of the other jurisdictions and ... policy
underlying Pennsylvania tort law . . .
The Third Circuit's ultimate decision to recognize deepening insolven-
cy as an independent cause of action rested upon three conclusions.5" The
Lafferty court's primary conclusion that the theory was "essentially sound"
in character was based on modern bankruptcy law, where a corporation,
39 As it happens, this co-defendant will live in infamy as the case's namesake, R.L.
Lafferty & Co.
40 Lafferty, 267 F3d at 345.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 347 (quoting the Amended Complaint) (alterations in original).
45 Id. (Deepening insolvency is characterized by the court as "injury to ... corporate
property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate
life.").
46 Id. at 340.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 349.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
2oo6-2oo7]
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though insolvent, may find value in its underlying property.53 To justify fur-
ther the "soundness" in the principle, the court noted that deepening in-
solvency could also disturb the corporation's "relationships with its custom-
ers, suppliers, and employees," and thereby diminish the overall value of
its corporate assets.' Secondly, the Lafferty court concluded that the theory
could discourage directors' and officers' fraudulent behavior that attempts
to prolong the life of an insolvent corporation.55 Relying heavily on Schacht
v. Brown,56 the Lafferty judges proposed that the harms of such actions could
"be averted, and the value within an insolvent corporation salvaged, if the
corporation is dissolved in a timely manner, rather than kept afloat with
spurious debt."5 " The court also explained that "[girowing acceptance of
the deepening insolvency theory confirms its soundness," whereas several
other jurisdictions have recognized a "cognizable injury to corporate debt-
ors" where the life of the enterprise had been fraudulently extended. 8 As
its final justification, the Lafferty court relied on "one of the most venerable
principles in Pennsylvania jurisprudence ... where there is an injury, the
law provides a remedy."5 9 By identifying that "tort law attempts to place
the injured party in the same position he occupied before the injury,"6 the
court held that where corporate assets are damaged by deepening insol-
vency, Pennsylvania tort law would remedy such an injury.61
B. Expanding Lafferty to Other Jurisdictions
Subsequent cases invoking Lafferty have put their own interpretations on
the benchmark case's holding. Take, for instance, In re Flagship Healthcare,61
which was decided shortly after Lafferty. There, a Florida bankruptcy court
held that a bankruptcy trustee had made a viable deepening insolvency
claim against a third party financial advisory firm which had offered the
53 Id.
54 Id. at 350.
55 Id.
56 Schacht v. Brown, 711 E2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that in the absence of
deepening insolvency, possible incentives may be garnered by wrong-doing officers who fail
to disclose such insolvency to shareholders).
57 Lafferty, 267 E3d at 350.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 35 1.
6o Id. (quoting Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F2d 1095, 1104 (3rd Cir. 198o)).
61 Id. ("[Wlhere 'deepening insolvency' causes damages to corporate property, we be-
lieve that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would provide a remedy by recognizing a cause of
action for that injury."). As the holding indicates, Lafferty applies "deepening insolvency" only
in situations arising under Pennsylvania law where a fraudulent behavior or activity clearly
extends a corporation's life past the point of its initial insolvency.
62 In re Flagship Healthecare Inc., 269 B.R. 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001).
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debtor corporation guidance concerning possible acquisition candidates.63
Relying on Lafferty, the Flagship court stated that if the firm's financial
valuation was negligently given and caused the debtor corporation to as-
sume additional debt, an injury occurred to the corporate body, regardless
of whether the corporation was insolvent before the valuation. 4 Though
failing to apply the fraud requirement inherent in the Lafferty decision,
the Flagship court succeeded in expanding Lafferty's reach to third-party
professionals, who were now amendable under a less stringent standard of
culpability than previously applied to deepening insolvency claims.
Lafferty received further affirmation in 2003 by In re Exide Technologies.65
In this case, a committee consisting of a corporation's unsecured creditors
brought a claim of deepening insolvency against a secured lender who had
further extended the corporation's line of credit from $650 million to $900
million to facilitate the acquisition of a competitor.6 In consideration for
this extension of credit, the debtor corporation provided "significant addi-
tional collateral and guarantees" to the secured lender. 67 The corporation's
financial situation rapidly worsened shortly after the acquisition, causing
the corporation to amend the loan agreement which extended to the se-
cured lender additional collateral in an effort to stall the collection pro-
cess.' The substance of the allegations behind the insolvency claim was
that the "[lienders caused the [diebtors to acquire [the competitor com-
pany] so that they could obtain the control necessary to force the [d]ebtors
fraudulently to continue its business for nearly two years at ever-increasing
levels of insolvency. '69 Reminiscent of Lafferty, the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court made an effort to predict how the Delaware Supreme Court would
rule in such a situation.70 The Bankruptcy Court held that the three factors
elucidated in Lafferty would also be controlling in Exide.71 The Exide court
noted that the "theory of deepening insolvency, particularly in a bankrupt-
cy context, was a sound one,""2 that there was "a growing acceptance of the
theory among courts,"73 and that, in regards to whether deepening insol-
vency constitutes an injury recognized under state law, "Delaware adheres
to the same principle as Pennsylvania referred to in Lafferty. 7 4
63 Id. at 728-29 .
64 Id. at 728.
65 In re Exide Techs., Inc., 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
66 Id. at 736.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 750-5 1.
70 Id. at 751
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 752.
2oo6-2oo7]
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Exide successfully expanded Lafferty's grip of culpability to include
lenders, but the significance of the Exide decision has more to do with the
jurisdiction in which the decision was rendered rather than any particular
expansions to the underlying theory of deepening insolvency. By postulat-
ing that the Delaware Supreme Court would recognize a claim of deepen-
ing insolvency, Exide opened the door for the theory's widespread expan-
sion into the corporate arena. Given that a majority of American companies
are incorporated in the state of Delaware,7" Exide's expansion of Lafferty to
this jurisdiction could have serious ramifications to the manner in which
most companies do business.
In sum, Lafferty and its successors, Flagship and Exide, have expanded
deepening insolvency's role in modern business practices. The cases stand
for the idea that directors, officers, and even third-party professionals can
be found liable in tort for deepening the insolvency of a debtor corporation.
Also, and perhaps more significantly, a court amalgamating the Flagship and
Exide holdings may justify a finding that culpability may be extended to
third-party professionals who do not fraudulently prolong a corporation's
life but who act in a negligent manner that leads to insolvency. Such a
holding could be devastating to the American economy. For instance, if
such precedent is controlling in a jurisdiction, a risk-adverse lender fearing
future ramifications of a loan may think twice before lending to a finan-
cially struggling, but otherwise solvent, corporation. Conversely, due to fear
of future third-party liability, it is probable that expanding Lafferty would
hinder a financially struggling company's overall ability to contract with
other businesses. Hesitation to make what formerly amounted to "normal"
contract would significantly impede not only the speed at which companies
do business but also the costs of doing business via higher transaction costs,
such as higher interest rates to compensate for additional risks inherent in a
deal where mere negligence could leave a company in future legal peril.
7 6
Lenders may be put in a situation where fear of possible insolvency
causes them to put more restrictions on how a company uses borrowed
funds. This action could substantially limit the company's ability to pur-
sue innovative, higher risk projects, which would significantly decrease the
overall growth of American business" and leave American consumers at the
pricing whim of overseas competitors in domestic product markets. Addi-
tionally, higher transaction costs could affect company profitability, thereby
generating less reward for corporate shareholders and possibly pushing
75 The state of Delaware is the corporate home of over half a million companies, in-
cluding over fifty percent of all publicly traded companies and sixty percent of the Fortune
500 businesses. See Del. Div. of Corp. Homepage, http://state.de.us/corp (last visited Feb. 27,
2007).
76 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 433 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing
effect of additional risks in contracting on interest rates).
77 Id. at 434-
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companies closer to possible insolvency if the business model fails or if
demand for a company's products deteriorates. 8 Either scenario could spell
trouble for not only American businesses but also for the Americans who
work in these businesses and consume these business products, causing
demand for the products and services of foreign companies, possibly oper-
ating under less restrictive commercial laws, to increase.
III. CASTING DOUBT ON LAFFER7-r TRENWICK AND ITS PREDECESSORS
Since Exide, several cases have cast doubt upon the viability of a separate
and independent claim of deepening insolvency. These decisions not only
question the expansions to the Lafferty holding applied in previous cases7 9
but also serve as strong precedent for future denials of tort-related deepen-
ing insolvency actions.
A. Global Service Group and its Progeny: Negligence is Not Enough
Decided shortly after Exide, the case of In re Global Service Group LLC
echoed Lafferty's proviso that a finding of fraud was requisite for any deep-
ening insolvency claim.80 In GlobalService, a U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New
York was faced with the following question reminiscent of Lafferty: Can a
lender who loans money to an insolvent debtor corporation be liable for
injuries sustained to the debtor under a deepening insolvency claim?," The
complaint alleged that the defendant, Atlantic Bank, based on its relation-
ship with the debtor corporation, Global Service Group LLC, "knew or
should have known that the debtor would be unable to repay its loans due
to its financial condition, but loaned the debtor money anyway.... ""' These
loans allegedly caused other creditors to extend money to Global Service
Group, which "prolong[ed] its corporate existence and incur[red] increased
debt which would have been avoided without the Atlantic Bank loans."8 3
The GlobalService court, correctly applying the Lafferty holding, announced
that "[pirolonging an insolvent corporation's life, without more, will not
result in liability" under a deepening insolvency claim.84 Instead, the court
mandated that "one seeking to recover for 'deepening insolvency' must
show that the defendant prolonged the company's life in breach of a sepa-
rate duty, or committed an actionable tort that contributed to the continued
78 Id. at 433.
79 See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
80 In re Global Serv. Group LLC, 316 B.R. 451 , 461 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
81 Id. at 455.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 456.
84 Id. at 458.
2oo6-2oo7]
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operation of a corporation and its increased debt."8 " In this court's opinion,
the ultimate problem associated with a deepening insolvency theory is that
the theory falsely assumes an insolvent company is "under an absolute duty
to liquidate.., and anyone who knowingly extends credit to the insolvent
company breaches an independent duty in the nature of aiding and abet-
ting the managers' wrongdoing."8 6 The court would rather rest an action on
a breach of fiduciary duty in contravention of the business judgment rule,
extending liability either to directors and officers or, if insolvency occurs, to
the creditors of the corporation, if a showing of "bad faith" or "fraudulent
intent" is made. 87
Since Global Service, subsequent cases have also recognized the neces-
sity of a finding of fraud before applying tort law to an action. In In re Var-
tec Telecom, Inc., a U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Texas decided that deepening
insolvency would not be recognized in the state as a separate tort because
the theory of injury was already encapsulated in existing torts, such as a
breach of fiduciary duty or accounting malpractice. 8  In Oakwood Homes,89
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware was again asked to play fortune
teller 9° by predicting not only how the Delaware Supreme Court would
decide the case, but, also due to a dispute between the parties as to which
state's law would apply to the claims, how the New York Court of Appeals
and North Carolina Supreme Court would weigh in on the issue of deep-
ening insolvency.9' Giving great deference to Lafferty, the Oakwood court
disagreed with Global Service's complete rejection of the doctrine of deep-
ening insolvency but stated mere negligence was insufficient to sustain
a complaint.9" The court cited that a showing of fraud, including its five
elements of "'representation of a material fact, falsity, scienter, reliance and
injury,"' must be provided for a successful deepening insolvency claim. 93
Global Service and its progeny helped tighten up the Lafferty holding by
recognizing the Lafferty court's desire to apply the tort concept of deepen-
ing insolvency to actions which included an element of fraud. To interested
parties worried about facing culpability under deepening insolvency claims
founded upon Exide's looser negligence standard, these decisions must
have been viewed as good news. However, the most significant chinks in
the tort armor of deepening insolvency had yet to come.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 459.
87 Id. at 46o-61.
88 In re Vartec Telecom, Inc., 335 B.R. 63 I, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
89 In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 340 B.R. 5i0 (Bankr. D. Del. zoo6).
90 See supra notes 52, 7o , and accompanying text.
91 Oakwood, 340 B.R. at 528.
92 Id. at 534.
93 Id. (quoting Vermeer Owners, Inc. v. Guterman, 585 N.E.2d 377, 387 (N.Y. i99i)).
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B. Strengthening the Opposition: CitX, Verestar, and Trenwick
The strongest affirmation that a deepening insolvency action cannot stand
on negligence alone was provided by In re CitX Corporation.9 The CitX
court noted that "Lafferty holds only that fraudulent conduct will suffice to
support a deepening-insolvency claim under Pennsylvania law" and that
"a claim of negligence cannot sustain a deepening insolvency cause of ac-
tion." 9
Despite recent attempts to limit Lafferty's expansion,' the harshest
blows to the deepening insolvency theory had yet to manifest. Just a few
days after the CitX opinion was delivered, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York predicted in In re Verestar, Inc.97 that
"Delaware state courts would not permit recovery against directors on an
independent tort of deepening insolvency where the debtor had a permis-
sible corporate charter provision, pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), gener-
ally exculpating directors from monetary damages other than for claims of
bad faith or breach of the duty of loyalty." 98
Finally, in August of 2006, Trenwick American Litigation Trust v. Ernst &
Young, LLP 9 laid to rest the speculation as to how a Delaware state court
would rule on a deepening insolvency claim. The Chancery Court pro-
posed that "under Delaware law, 'deepening insolvency' is no more of a
cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause of action for 'shallow-
ing profitability' would be when a firm is solvent."'00 Noting the risk direc-
tors take in their ultimate quests for success in their businesses, the court
also mandated that "[t]he incantation of the word insolvency . . . should
not declare open season on corporate fiduciaries."1 1 The court declared
that "rejection of an independent cause of action for deepening insolvency
does not absolve directors of insolvent corporations of responsibility" and
that plaintiffs are instead "remit[ted] ... to the contents of their traditional
toolkit, which contains, among other things, causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and for fraud."'10  With such statements, the court charac-
terized an injury evaluation under a deepening insolvency theory by the
equitable principles of breach and business judgment inherent in corpora-
tion law. 0 3 Therefore, if the corporation is acting in good faith and exercis-
94 In re CitX Corp., 448 F3d 672 (3rd Cir. 2006).
95 Id. at 68 1. For a full commentary on this case, see Brighton, supra note 8.
96 Setsupra notes 8o-95 and accompanying text.
97 In reVersetar, Inc., 343 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
98 Brighton, supra note 8, at 69.
99 Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006).
ioo Id. at 174.
ioi Id.
102 Id. at 205
103 Id.
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ing due diligence, actions in the realm of insolvency "are protected by the
business-judgment rule, and any other conclusion would be contrary to ac-
cepted legal standards."'0
In sum, the current deepening insolvency theory at work today dictates
that under Delaware law, unless evidence is presented to the contrary, a
corporation's directors and officers, while acting in good faith and exercis-
ing due diligence, cannot be found liable under a separate and indepen-
dent allegation of deepening that corporation's insolvency. However, Tren-
wick failed to address the consequences of a deepening insolvency claim
against third party professionals, such as lenders. Applying Trenwick's hold-
ing to Global Service's proviso that fiduciary duty transfers to the creditors
of a corporation once that corporation is insolvent,' one could glean from
this information that, in applying Delaware law to causes of action against
third party lenders, the business judgment rule will also shield them from
liability unless a showing of bad faith is made.
IV. THE OPTIONs BACKDATING SCANDAL
For the purposes of this section, it is critical to keep in mind the difference
between debt and equity financing as it concerns the establishment of a
corporation. When a corporation is in its beginning stages, it may choose
to issue either debt or equity in the corporation as a means of financing its
burgeoning business. Debt financing usually exists in the form of bonds," 6
which means the corporation borrows money from others to finance its
ventures. The corporation in this respect would become the debtor, while
the lenders of the money would be its creditors.107 The creditors retain no
104 Brighton, supra note 8, at 69.
1o5 See In re Global Serv. Group LLC, 316 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.. 2004) ("Once
insolvency ensues, the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors also etend to credi-
tors."); see also Luis Salazar, Is the Tide Turning on D&O Claims?, 24-APR Am. BANKR. INST. J. 1,
45 (Apr. 2005) (proposing that, given GlobalService's holding that fiduciary duty extends to the
creditors of an insolvent corporation, a successful deepening insolvency cause of action must
allege the fiduciary acted in bad faith or committed fraud in order to "overcome the protec-
tions of the business-judgment rule").
io6 "Bonds" are defined as "long term debt securities that are secured by collateral of
the corporation," whereas debentures are long term unsecured debt securities, whose value is
determined by corporation's general credit rating as identified by a major credit rating service,
such as Moody's or Standard & Poor's. WESLEY B. IhuIrT-, THE CORPORATION 109 (2oo6). For
more information concerning the credit rating services of Moody's and Standard & Poor's, see
http://www.moodys.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) and http://www.standardandpoors.com
(last visited Feb. 27, 2007). For a detailed discussion of corporate bonds, see Marcel Kahan,
Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y. U. L.
REV. 1040 (2002).
107 "Debtor" is defined as "[o]ne who owes an obligation to another, esp[ecially] an ob-
ligation to pay money." BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY 433 (8th ed. 2004). Conversely, "creditor" is
defined as "[o]ne to whom a debt is owed." Id. at 396.
[Vol. 95
DEEPENING INSOLVENCY THEORY
entitlements to any profits or revenues-their only claim against a corpora-
tion lies in the ability to receive payments upon the interest and principal
mandated in the loan agreement. 1 8 However, creditors, who retain rights in
the assets of the corporation up to the amounts of their lending, bear fewer
costs of monitoring the corporation because they must worry only about
the value of the underlying assets "earmarked to repay their loans" and not
about potential insolvency.1 9 The bondholders' rights to their investment
in the corporation are dictated by the trust indenture, which essentially is
a contract between the corporation issuing the bonds and a trustee for the
bondholders that mandates the rights of each party to the agreement. II0
The trustee has no obligation to act on behalf of the bondholders until
there is a default in payment of either principal or interest by the corpora-
tion.' At this point, the trustee exercises the powers articulated to him by
the terms of the indenture, which may include the power to redeem any
delinquent interest or principal payments in full amount or even the power
to "call in" the full value of the debt owed by the corporation."'
Equity financing involves the issuance of common stock in the corpora-
tion. Purchasers of these shares of stock become owners in the corporation,
insomuch as they would be entitled to corporate earnings distributions, vot-
ing powers for the corporation's board of directors, and for a public corpora-
tion, the ability to sell the stock to other prospective buyers in the second-
ary market at prices that supply and demand dictate." 3 Equity purchasers
in a corporation share in the benefit of possible unexpectedly high returns
in their investment, whereas a corporate lender is expecting a return on
its investment of a fixed amount." 4 However, because a corporation could
become completely insolvent, equity purchasers may find themselves in
an unenviable position when compared to corporate lenders, as the former
bears the lion's share of the risk and monitoring costs as they keep tabs on
their more speculative investment.' 5
In the case of insolvency within a public corporation, equity purchasers
may find themselves better prepared for exiting an investment than a cor-
porate lender. For instance, equity purchasers within a public corporation
can always sell their ownership interests in the corporation, or stock, on the
secondary market, or stock exchange in which the corporation is listed, at
Io8 See TRUITT, supra note Io6, at Io8.
I19 See POSNER, supra note 76, at 436.
I io See UPIC & Co. v. Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 448, 450 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (defining "trust indenture").
I I I See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.S. § 77000(c) (LexisNexis zoo6).
112 See 5 "iOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 19.6
(5th ed. Supp. 2005).
13 SeeTkuiTT, supra note io6, at io8.
114 See POSNER, supra note 76, at 438.
1'5 Seeid. at 436.
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the first sign of trouble."16 Given the fixed nature of the agreement entered
into between a corporate lender and the borrowing corporation, a corporate
lender has no viable exit strategy at the point of insolvency and becomes
a prisoner to the bankruptcy proceedings."7 Stocks, as related to executive
compensation, are the underlying catalyst of the options backdating scan-
dal,'" but it is important for purposes of evaluating prospective deepening
insolvency claims to remain mindful of the bondholders' rights within the
corporate structure.
A. Executive Compensation
Compensation packages for senior executives of many large corporations
are substantial to say the least. The median CEO base salary for the 500
largest U.S. companies was $950,000 in 2003." 9 In an effort to sweeten the
pot for these executives, and possibly circumvent the tax law,'2 0 corpora-
tions often provide supplemental income in the form of executive bonus
pay. In 2003, the median bonus these CEOs received was $1,064,000,21 and
much of these bonus packages was in the form of stock options. In 2005,
the average chief executive's pay, including salary, bonus, stock, and stock
options grants, was $10,500,000, a figure over 369 times higher than the
average worker's salary.'
Generally, stock options are a grant of stock that the employee must
keep for a stipulated number of years before "exercising the option" and
buying the stock at the price listed on the face of the option."3 This "option
price" is typically determined by the market value of the share, as deter-
mined by the public exchange on which it is traded, on the date of option
granting.2 4 Herein lies the appeal of a stock option for both the company
116 This statement assumes that the corporation's stock is publicly traded on a major
exchange and that there is a readily available market for the shares. For more discussion of the
major U.S. exchanges, see infra note 124.
117 See POSNER, supra note 76, at 445-46.
i18 See infra notes I 19-7o and accompanying text.
1 9 SeeIiuirT, supra note io6, at 87.
120 Publicly held companies cannot deduct any executive's compensation that exceeds
$i million a year as a business expense unless tied to performance. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West
2006). The company's method of circumventing the tax code by sweetening the pot with
stock bonuses is considered to be a catalyst in the appearance of the options backdating prac-
tice. See Jonathan Peterson, Law on Executive Pay May Have Backfired, STEATrLE TI MES, Sept. 7,
2006, at C3; Lawmakers Mull Elimination of Options Deduction, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2006, at 2.
121 See TIuITT, supra note io6, at 87.
122 See Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money Rules: BehindSoaring Executive Pay, Decades
of Failed Restraints-Instead of Damping Rewards, Disclosure, Taxes, Options Helped Push Them
Higher-Return of Golden Parachutes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, zoo6, at Ai.
123 luiwT, supra note 1o6, at 88.
124 The two major stock exchanges for public corporations in the U.S. are the New York
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and the executive. The purpose is to award the executive for good perfor-
mance, so the hope is that the stock's price will be much higher at the time
of exercise, due to exemplary company performance, than when the option
was originally issued.' For instance, if an executive is granted the option
to purchase in three years 1,000 shares of Company X for $10 per share,
and after that three-year period, due to the company's superb performance,
the shares are trading for $50 per share in the secondary market,2 6 the ex-
ecutive will pay only $10,000 for shares worth $50,000, realizing a windfall
of $40,000.117 Stock options not only help bolster the compensation lev-
el for executives working for the upper-tier U.S. companies but also can
also serve to bring superior performers to upstart companies. As stated by
Securities and Exchange Commission1 18 Chairman Christopher Cox, "for
growth companies, the use of stock options as compensation offers a way
to conserve resources while attracting top-flight talent in highly competi-
tive markets."'' 1 9 When properly used, stock options can serve an important
purpose in generating and sustaining corporate viability.
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Getting Tough on Corporate Governance
In response to various corporate scandals of the early twenty-first cen-
tury, 130 Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Act") to increase the
SEC's oversight ability of American corporations. 3' The Act "increase[d]
accountability of corporate officers by requiring greater disclosure require-
ments and harsher penalties for violations of securities laws." 13 The Act
not only required top-level executives, such as a corporation's CEO and
CFO, to take personal responsibility for the veracity of all corporate finan-
cial documents but also required corporations to establish certain internal
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations ("NASDAQ"). For more information on listed companies and exchange listing
requirements, see http://www.nyse.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) and http://www.nasdaq.
com (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
125 TRuITr, supra note i06, at 89.
126 See supra note 1 24 and accompanying text.
127 This example is modeled after the one provided in "Iurr, supra note io6, at 89.
128 Hereinafter "SEC."
129 Hearing on Stock Options Backdating Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban
Affairs, io9th Cong. (2oo6) (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission), available at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction-Hearings.Detail
&HearingID-233 [hereinafter Hearing on Stock Options Backdatingl.
130 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. For more information concerning the
Worldcom scandal, which also caused shockwaves throughout the corporate world, see http://
www.worldcomlitigation.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
131 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7262 (LexisNexis zoo6).
132 TRurr, supra note io6, at 197.
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controls "designed to ensure discovery of material information."I 3  Another
component of the Act, section 403, which was considered to be a "relatively
obscure" provision at the time of inception, has now become the key fac-
tor spearheading the options backdating scandal.'34 Section 40313 requires
"public company officers and directors to report their receipt of stock op-
tions within two days of the grant," i36 as opposed to reporting grants at
"the end of the fiscal year,"' 137 as previously mandated. 3 It was not until a
few years after section 403's implementation that the problems amenable
under this provision would be detected. 39
C. How a Midwestern Professor Reshaped Wall Street
In 2005, Eric Lie, an assistant professor of finance at the University of Iowa,
ran across something peculiar. In the years preceding Sarbanes-Oxley,
companies had become increasingly proficient in granting stock options
to executives at low stock prices.140 Professor Lie's subsequent study 141
"document[ed] negative abnormal stock returns before and positive re-
turns after CEO option grants between 1992 and 2002."' 42 Lie's research 143
showed that the exceptional ability displayed by corporate officers to pro-
vide low stock price grants has significantly diminished since Sarbanes-
Oxley.' 44 This research provided evidence of direct manipulation of stock
options granted to corporate officers, or what has come to be known as "op-
tions backdating." 145
133 Id. at 198.
134 David Henry, A SarbOx Surprise; the New Requirements are Slowing Options Tricks, Bus.
WK., Jun. 12, 2oo6, at 38.
135 See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, § 403(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (West 2007));
see also Alex Depetris & Ben Park, Development in Banking and Financial Law: 2003: I. Sarbanes
Oxley Act of2002, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 18, 25-26 (2004) (discussing evolution and
codification of § 403).
136 Hearing on Stock Options Backdating, supra note 129 (testimony of Mark Olsen,
Chairman, Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board).
137 Id. (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
138 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Dating Game, 29 NAT'L L. J., Sept. 4, 2006, at 13.
139 See infra notes 141-68 and accompanying text.
140 See Hearing on Stock Options Backdating, supra note 129 (testimony of Erik Lie) [here-
inafter "Lie Testimony"].
141 Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. Sc. 802 (2005) [here-
inafter "Lie Article"].
142 See Lie Testimony, supra note 140.
143 Seesupra notes 141 & 142; RANDALLA. HERON & ERIC LIE, DOEs BACKDATING EXPLAIN
THE STOCK PRICE PA'TERN AROUND EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION GRANTs? 83 J. OF FIN. ECON. 271
(2007), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-JFE.pdf.
144 See Lie Testimony, supra note 14o; Henry, supra note 134.
145 Lie's research efforts have not gone unrewarded, as he is now entertaining consulting
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In general, options backdating is the "retrospective pricing of stock op-
tion grants."' 1 6 Specifically, options are "backdated" when the "issuer se-
lects a date in the past on which its stock was trading at a low price, and
retrospectively 'grants' the option as of that past date," allowing "the ex-
ecutive to exercise the option at a lower price than the stock's market price
on the day the issuer's board or compensation committee actually approved
the grant."'47 Therefore, if a company was attempting to backdate stock
options in a manner to reward a director for valuable service, a company
could pick a date in the past in which the company's stock was trading on
the listing stock exchange at a historical low to maximize that director's
potential profit at the time of option exercise.' 48 For example, suppose that
on the current date, the company's stock is trading at $30 per share. Prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley, an opportunistic company could refer to a date up to a year
earlier when the company's stock was trading at a historical low, such as
$10 per share, and use this date as the date of option grant. If this company
granted the director an option for 2,000 shares of stock with an exercise
price of $10 per share on the date of the historical low, the company would
have effectively given the director a present-day right to $60,000 worth of
stock 149 for $20,000,150 resulting in a $40,000 windfall to the director. In sum,
the options would be retrospectively issued "in the money," meaning that
the options had a positive cash value at the date of issue.5 1 Essentially, the
company would get away with granting the director a $40,000 cash bonus
disguised as a successful option exercise.
Lie's study has caused several companies to appear on the SEC radar
for options improprieties,' including many small Silicon Valley compa-
offers from many law firms around the country in hopes of tailoring his expertise into their
plaintiffs' claims against backdating companies. See Peter Burrows, He's Making Hay as CEO's
Squirm; Erik Lie Uncovered Widespread Options Backdating. Now He's Reaping Rewards, Bus. WK.
Jan. 15, 2007, at 64.
146 See Vanyo & Weisman, supra note 2 1, at *3.
147 Id.
148 See Lie Testimony, supra 140 (outlining stock manipulation strategies aimed at maxi-
mizing executive bonus).
149 Calculated as follows: the current market price of stock ($30 per share) multiplied by
2,000 shares of the stock option grant.
I5O Calculated as follows: the price at historical low ($io per share) multiplied by 2,000
shares of the stock option grant.
151 See Lie Testimony, supra note 140 (defining "in the money").
152 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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nies15 and such prominent names as United Healthcare 5 4 and Apple.'- As
of April 17, 2007,140 companies have been implicated. s6 These misappro-
priations have caused company founders,5 7 CEOs,' s and corporate coun-
sels, 15 9 once admired by their employees and industry peers, to leave their
positions in shame. Outrageous examples of corporate greed have mani-
fested, including an African manhunt for one fugitive backdating CEO160
and the improbable receipt and exercise of options made from beyond the
grave by one recently deceased corporate executive.' 61 Such incidents have
left investors wondering where it all will end.
Backdating can have serious consequences for offending companies.
One legal scholar has noted several areas in which backdating may expose
companies to liability, such as accounting issues creating liability under
153 Silicon Valley is an area of Northern California which serves as headquarters for many
of the country's technology companies, including such household names as Apple Computer,
Yahoo!, Google, and eBay. For more information regarding this unique area, see Santa Clara
County, California's Historic Silicon Valley, http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/santaclara/intro.
htm (Feb. 27, 2007).
154 See James Bandler & Charles Forelle, Embattled CEO to Step Down at UnitedHealth-
Top Post Will Go to Hemsley as Options Scandal Claims Highest-Profile Casualty Yet, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 16, 2oo6, atAi.
155 See Charles Forelle, James Bandler & Nick Wingfield, Jobs Knew Apple Manipulated
Some Options Grants, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at A3; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., A Typical
Miscreant-If, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2007, at A12 (noting that despite company statements that
CEO Steve Jobs received no financial benefit from backdated options, Apple may not yet
be out of the spotlight); Nick Wingfield & Steve Stecklow, Apple's Options Probe Could Raise
Conflicts-Two Outside Panel Members Might Have Been Involved with Problematic Grants, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 2006, at A3.
156 See Emily Steel, Wall Street Journal Wins Pair of Pulitizers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2007,
at A2.
157 See James Bandler & Mark Maremont, Monster's Founder Quits Board Amid Options
Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2oo6, at A3 (discussing departure of job search web site Monster.
com founder); Charles Forelle & James Bandler, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top
Officials Take a Fall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12. 2oo6, at As (notes departure of founder of web pub-
lisher CNET Networks Inc. following internal probe which discovered backdated options).
158 See Bandler & Forelle, supra note 154.
159 See Paul Davies, A SecondComverse Ex-Executive Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2oo6,
at A3 (reporting on the former general counsel of Comverse Technology, who is a Harvard Law
School graduate, pleading guilty to conspiracy charge related to backdating stock options.).
i6o See Charles Forelle, Kara Scannell & Paul Davies, A Fugitive's Haven in Africa Turned
Out to be Anything but-Kobi Alexander is Arrestedin Namibia; the Tip Off was a Hefty Bank Transfer,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 28, 2oo6, at At; Manhuntfor Comverse Ex-ChiefEnds in Africa, Cm. THi., Sept.
28, zoo6, at 2 (discussing the arrest of former CEO of Comverse Technology, Inc. in Namibia
following a two-month international manhunt).
161 See Peter Grant, James Bandler & Charles Forelle, Cablevision Gave Backdated Grant to
Dead Official-Two Directors Quit Key Posts Amid Earnings Restatement; An Awardfora Consultant,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2006, at Ai (noting that a probe released information that options were
given to the vice chairman after his death but were backdated, making it appear as though
they were granted while he was still alive).
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securities law, 161 certain Sarbanes-Oxley violations, 163 and multiple viola-
tions of federal tax law."M One violation that should be specifically noted
is the provision of Sarbanes-Oxley requiring that companies found to have
misled the investing public in their financials must restate their financial
results for the time periods in controversy.165 This earnings restatement can
impede a company's ability to produce its current quarterly reports.166 The
failure to file a timely quarterly financial statement can leave a company in
default with current bondholders, giving bondholders an option to "call in"
their outstanding debts immediately, some of which may not be fully due
for several years.' 67 Though this provision may leave a minor blemish on
the balance sheets of behemoth companies such as United Healthcare and
Apple, smaller cash-strapped companies may find themselves entering into
the realm of insolvency, leaving bankruptcy or additional credit facilities as
their only recourse. 168
D. Hedge Funds: Profiting from Pain in the Distressed Debt Market
The financial dissipation of these backdating companies has produced op-
portunistic behavior by hedge funds looking to make a quick profit.' 69 Gen-
erally, a hedge fund cannot be characterized in any standard definitions, 7 '
as its ability to function in multiple financial markets using varied finan-
162 See Vanyo & Weisman, supra note 21, at *5-9 (noting potential liability under Rule
iob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for inaccurate financial disclosure state-
ments created by backdating).
163 Id. at *io.
164 Id. at *13.
165 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, section 304 requires the CEO and CFO to repay the
company all incentive or equity-based compensation and stock sale profits they receive
within a year after any accounting misconduct resulting in a restatement. 15 U.S.C.S. § 7243
(LexisNexis zoo6).
I66 See Backdating Sparks Bond Battle, CFO MAG., Aug. 30, 2o6, at 5 (noting that delays
in earnings restatement due to backdating probe can cause companies to miss reporting their
current earnings).
167 Id.; see also Beth Bar, A Company's Tardy SEC Reports Prompt Debt Default Finding,
234 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 3, 2oo6, at 4; Hedge Funds Look to Cash in on Late Filings by
Companies, CHI. TIB., Sept. 13, 2006, at 9; Peter Lattman & Karen Richardson, Hedge Funds
Play Hardball with Firms Filing Late Financials, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at Ai.
168 See Lattman & Richardson, supra note 167. For a detailed discussion of this topic,
see Kevin M. LaCroix, Hedge Fund Hardball and D & 0 Risk, available at http:l/dandodiary.
blogspot.com/zoo6/o8/hedge-fund-hardball-and-d-o-risk.html (Feb. 27, 2007).
169 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
170 See Jonathan Bevilacqua, Comment, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines
Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 258 (2006) (citing Brandon
Becket & Colleen Doherty-Minicozzi, Hedge Funds in Global Financial Markets, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN UNREGISTERED INVESTMENT VEHICLES I59, 164 (2000)).
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cial tools makes it its own animal."7 ' However, as suggested by then-SEC
Chairman William H. Donaldson, the term hedge fund "has developed into
a catch-all classification for many unregistered privately managed pools of
capital."'7 2 Unlike other investment funds, such as mutual funds, which
find themselves investing in certain capital markets under the guidelines
of the SEC and their own fund goals, hedge funds are not constrained by
any certain investment model or strategy, returning gains to private inves-
tors by exploiting pricing discrepancies in any financial instrument they so
choose to invest.
73
Hedge funds typically have been veiled in secrecy concerning their op-
erations and investors' identities, with most investing clients being high
net worth individuals who are less concerned about investment strategy
and more concerned about absolute returns.'74 Given the limited number
of investors in such funds and the high net worth of these individuals,
hedge funds have found themselves excluded from SEC oversight applied
to most managed funds. 7 Hedge funds typically invest in liquid markets,
creating ease in the transfer to and from different investment options.176
Hedge funds have seen increased prominence in financial markets during
the last several years. From 1994 to 2004, the number of funds in existence
increased from 1,100 to 5,700, and estimated investments in hedge funds
grew from $324 billion to $592 billion since the turn of the century 77
Given their flexibility to trade within a wide variety of financial instru-
ments, hedge funds have leapt at the opportunity to take advantage of
market pricing inefficiencies with respect to companies currently in the
options backdating spotlight. Backdating companies, due to their financial
instability and concerns as to the legitimacy of earnings, have seen their
171 See The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effect of Strategies for Managing Market Risk:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters of the Comm. on
Fin. Servs., io8th Cong. (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities &
Exchange Commission) (postulating that the SEC may never "come up with a definition that
is broad enough or meaningful enough" to define hedge funds), available at http://commdocs.
house.gov/committees/banklhba89633.ooo/hba89633of.htm; see also Alex R. McClean, Note,
The Extraterritorial Implications of the SEC's Nero Rule Change to Regulate Hedge Funds, 38 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. io5, io8 (2oo6) (noting that hedge funds employ a variety of different strate-
gies to invest money).
172 Recent Developments in Hedge Funds: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and
Urban Affairs, io8th Cong. (2003) (prepared statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://banking.senate.gov/-files/donaldsn.
pdf [hereinafter Recent Developments in Hedge Funds Hearing].
173 See McClean, supra note 171, at io9-io; Bevilacqua, supra note 170, at 259.
174 See Bevilacqua, supra note 17o , at 259.
175 See McClean, supra note 17 i, at 1 16-17.
176 See Bevilacqua, supra note 170, at 259.
177 See Recent Developments in Hedge Funds Heating, supra note 172 (prepared statement
of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes).
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corporate bond ratings deteriorate.'7 ' As a result, questions about company
viability have also caused concerns as to whether these companies will be
unable to pay the current debts they have, causing bond prices to trade at a
discounted value in the open market. 79 Though hedge funds have always
looked at this discounted pricing as a means of taking over the debt of a
corporation and forcing changes in management,' 0 hedge funds are cur-
rently seizing these opportunities to buy the distressed company's debt
at a discount in hopes of accelerating the debt to a quick payout in the
amount of face value upon the company's failure to file earnings.'8' An-
other opportunity presents itself if, as in the case of United Healthcare, the
bondholders get a quick settlement in consideration for not calling in the
corporation's defaulted bonds. 8" Therefore, the options backdating scandal
has also provided another avenue for hedge fund managers to make a quick
buck by operating in the distressed debt environment.
V. DEEPENING INSOLVENCY IN THE OPTIONS BACKDATING ERA
The hedge funds, by investing in such a manner,8 3 have given corporations
limited options in dealing with recalcitrant bondholders. Corporations can
either (1) avoid default by paying a lump-sum settlement to the bondhold-
ers to stop any debt acceleration process, (2) try to pay off the complete
amount of the outstanding debt, or (3) go under and quit business opera-
tions. Assuming that the latter is not a viable choice, the question remains
whether either of the remaining activities could result in viable claims un-
der a deepening insolvency theory against two parties of defendants: (a) the
corporation's directors and officers, or (b) the lenders facilitating additional
credit on behalf of a borrowing corporation in an effort to pay off either a
lump sum settlement to bondholders or the entire amount of the outstand-
ing debt. As proposed earlier, deepening insolvency, though still viable in
theory, has been dealt serious blows by recent case law which will affect a
plaintiff's ability to bring such a claim with any degree of success.'84
178 See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Curiosity Has its Merits and its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, zoo6,
at Ci.
179 See id. (discussing activities of opportunistic hedge funds which scour the financial
markets for bond mispricing in an effort to increase returns); see also supra note 168 and ac-
companying text.
18o See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 178; see also Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran,
Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39
STAN. J. INT'L L. 253 (2003) (discussing the actions and evolution of "vulture funds").
181 See supra notes 166-68.
182 See supra note 166-68.
183 See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
184 Seesupra notes 79-IO5 and accompanying text.
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A. Possible Deepening Insolvency Claims against Directors and Officers
Director and officer liability, specifically as it relates to an insolvent corpo-
ration trying to bargain with various creditors for an extension of its corpo-
rate life, raises the issue of deepening insolvency possibly being alleged
against these parties. 85 The argument is that the directors and officers, act-
ing with knowledge that the firm is insolvent or unable to satisfy outstand-
ing liabilities, may try to borrow more money in an effort to provide either
payment of a lump sum settlement to satisfy a bondholder's request or to
provide full payment of all outstanding debts.'86 In theory, such a wrong-
ful expansion in debt outside the corporation's ability to pay would, by
definition, meet the Laffery litmus test of deepening insolvency.'87 Obvi-
ously, directors' borrowing with knowledge of an inability to repay the debt
would constitute fraud.'88 However, if the decision by the directors and
officers is made in good faith and the corporation is amenable to Delaware
law, the business judgment rule should shield the parties from liability, in
accord with Trenwick.89 Trenwick's only limitation is the possibility that the
decision may be reversed upon appeal.190 Otherwise, the finding of fraud in
the transaction should limit plaintiffs to their "traditional toolkit" of claims
whose remedies lie in actions for breach of specific corporate fiduciary du-
ties. 191 Without a reversal, Trenwick should mitigate Lafferty's impact out-
side of Delaware, as most courts look to Delaware for guidance in modern
corporate law.19 Therefore, even with a finding of fraud in the transaction,
deepening insolvency claims against corporate executives should be ren-
dered obsolete. 93
In conclusion, it should also be noted that, due to certain boilerplate
provisions of the contract signed in the corporate capacity, directors and
officers are typically excluded from personal liability to bondholders in the
trust indenture. 94 Directors and officers considering the ramifications of
dealing with vulture hedge funds trying to make a quick buck should be
185 See supra notes i66-68 and accompanying text.
186 Id.
187 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.E Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 E3 d 340,347
(3rd Cir. 2001), overmledin part by In re Cybergeneics Corp., 304 E3 d 316 (3rd Cir. 2ooz).
188 "Fraud" is defined as "[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment
of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
685 (8th ed. 2004).
189 See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168, 205 (Del. Ch.
2oo6).
19o As of May 19, 2007, Trenwick has yet to be challenged on appeal.
i9i Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 205 (noting that plaintiff's "traditional toolkit" consists of
"causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and for fraud").
192 See Del. Div. of Corp. Homepage, http://state.de.us/corp (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
193 See Salazar, supra note io5, at 46 and accompanying text.
194 See Kahan, supra note ,o6, at vo65.
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comforted in this fact, so long as they are acting in good faith in the bargain-
ing process.
B. Possible Deepening Insolvency Claims against Lenders
Could lenders who provide credit facilities to companies seeking to pay
off bondholders be found liable for corporate damages via a deepening
insolvency claim? Global Service certainly provided that lenders who had
knowledge of the debtor's bleak financial future could be amenable to such
an action when fraud is shown.195 However, though Trenwick did not speak
directly on the lender liability subject, it appears the principles of fiduciary
duty would also cover this situation within Delaware. As previously stated,
Global Service extended fiduciary duties to the creditors of a corporation
when that corporation is found to be insolvent. 196 Therefore, applying Tren-
wick to this situation, it seems that once a creditor is found to owe a fidu-
ciary duty to an insolvent debtor corporation, plaintiffs would be relegated
to the "traditional toolkit" of remedies, namely the breach remedies.'97
Moreover, as long as the Trenwick decision is controlling on the subject of
deepening insolvency, lenders should not have to worry about being found
liable under this tort theory.
Additionally, most breaches that occur between an issuer of corporate
debt and bondholders will be governed by state contract law, as the trust
indenture is the contract that dictates each party's rights in the event of
default. 98 Therefore, the contract itself may dictate who has the power to
pursue actions against whom, leaving only remedies sounding in contract
as a possibility for the injured party.
VI. CONCLUSION
Directors and officers of corporations involved in the options backdating
scandal have many reasons to worry: the erosion of corporate assets attrib-
utable to litigation or payoff of bondholders; fears of business failure or the
wilting of investor confidence in a given brand; and the probability of SEC
sanctions, including penalties and possibly jail time. Corporate executives
and the lenders that may eventually provide capital to them in an effort to
postpone possible financial deterioration should not have to worry about
195 See supra notes 8o-87 and accompanying text.
196 See In re Global Serv. Group LLC, 316 B.R. 451,46o (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
197 See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 9o6 A.zd 168, 205 (Del. Ch.
zoo6).
198 See Kahan, supra note io6, at io44 ("Most aspects of bondholder rights ... are not
regulated by the Trust Indenture Act and are thus left open to contracting."). One could glean
from this statement that bondholder rights will typically be governed by state contract law.
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the possibility of additional damages being laid upon them via a finding of
injury in tort under a theory of deepening insolvency.
Recent decisions such as Trenwick stand for the premise that the ulti-
mate reason deepening insolvency fails as a separate and distinct cause of
action is because a corporation's leaders should be allowed flexibility in de-
ciding how to run their business. This flexibility allows decision makers to
take calculated risks with their enterprises, providing companies with the
ability to bring innovative products to the marketplace. Ages of case law
have already provided remedies to curb a corporation's ability to neglect
their inherent duties. When evaluated in this light, it is readily apparent
why deepening insolvency will not survive. Because of its "duplicative"
nature within the law,' 99 the theory provides no unique remedy to plaintiffs.
Any claims brought under a theory of deepening insolvency could easily be
brought under their original incarnations, which are the modern remedies
for breach of a specific duty owed to the insolvent corporation and rem-
edies allowable under state contract law.
199 In reVersetar, Inc., 343 B.R. 444, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo6).
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